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Petroleum subsidy reform is increasingly seen as an opportunity for consolidating public finances and 
fostering sustainable economic development. Yemen, as the country with the lowest per capita income in 
the group of countries with a high level of energy subsidies, started to reduce subsidies in 2010 and is 
discussing further options for reform. The results of this paper support a comprehensive petroleum 
subsidy reform in Yemen. Economic growth is projected to accelerate between 0.1 and 0.8 percentage 
points annually as a result of reform. Yet, the design of the reform is critically important, especially for 
the poor. Outcomes of alternative reform scenarios range from an increase in poverty of 2 to 6 percentage 
points. A promising strategy combines subsidy reduction with direct transfers of 13,800 to 19,700 
Yemeni rials annually to the poorest 30 percent of households and enhanced public investments. 
Investments should focus on the utilities, transport, trade, and construction sectors to integrate economic 
spaces and create the platform for a restructuring of agricultural, industrial, and service value chains, 
which should encourage private sector led and job creating growth in the medium term. 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
Petroleum subsidies strain public finances, distort markets, and provide only a blunt tool in the fight 
against poverty.
1 In many countries, such as Azerbaijan, Bolivia, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, and Jordan, 
petroleum subsidies account for more than 3 percent of GDP and are comparable in size to public 
spending on health and education combined (World Bank 2008; Coady et al. 2006). In addition to 
diverting resources away from more productive uses, fuel price subsidies have many negative side-effects 
that create welfare reducing policy trade, or simply undermine the original policy objective. Energy 
subsidy induced distortions lead to misguided price information and ensuing investment decisions.  The 
welfare price for re-adjustment needs to be borne by the society as a whole. Energy subsidies lead to 
unnecessary waste, are likely to slow adaptation of new energy saving technologies, and as result, have 
often negative environmental effects (von Moltke, McKee, and Morgan 2004; Ellis 2010). On the 
consumer side, it is usually the better-off households that disproportionally benefit most from petroleum 
subsidies, thus undermining social equity. For the reasons mentioned above it is also a very inefficient 
policy tool for poverty reduction (Coady et al. 2006; Bacon and Kojima 2006). Additional challenges 
related to fuel subsidies often include fuel adulteration, smuggling and an inefficient petroleum 
processing sector, given the premiums involved in the shadow market. 
Notwithstanding economic arguments, the global size of subsidies and the number of countries 
with petroleum subsidies has increased, mainly due to higher world fuel prices and newly imposed 
subsidies by governments. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) estimates that the absolute size of 
global pretax petroleum subsidies has increased eightfold between 2003 and 2010, to about 0.7 percent of 
global gross domestic product (GDP; Coady et al. 2010). Out of a sample of 38 developing countries, at 
least 14 countries have suspended market-based pricing between 2004 and 2006, joining 12 others that 
had already controlled prices (ESMAP 2006; Bacon and Kojima 2010). Yet for both temporarily 
introduced and more permanent subsidy schemes, reform becomes more urgent given increasing budget 
constraints and evidence of the negative economic and social impacts. In fact, several governments have 
launched substantial reforms lately, including Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Iran, Syria and very recently 
Yemen. 
Governments have begun to question existing energy subsidy schemes, yet there is often 
uncertainty about the impact of potential reform. The economic and social impact of subsidy reform 
differs from country to country.
2 Many studies find that petroleum subsidy reforms raise overall 
economic growth, mostly explained by economic efficiency gains over time (Clements et al. 2007; Jensen 
and Tarr 2002; Burniaux 2009; von Moltke, McKee, and Morgan 2004). Hope and Singh (1995) show 
that in three of six countries studied in the years after reforming the petroleum subsidy, GDP grew faster 
than before, and growth in the other three countries quickly accelerated in the years after the 
implementation of the reform.
3 The social impact of fuel subsidy reform has been less widely studied, yet 
there are indications that the poor may be the main losers from reform. Coady et al. (2006) find in their 
six-country study that real incomes of the poorest household groups decline between 1.8 percent in Mali 
up to 9.1 percent in Ghana. This is consistent with empirical evidence from Hope and Singh (1995), who 
find decreases in real household incomes of 1–3 percent due to subsidy reform. These findings are further 
confirmed by the experience of the 2007/2008 global food and fuel crisis, where rising prices for 
petroleum products and food have led to an increase in poverty (Breisinger et al. 2010; Ivanic and Martin 
2008). 
                                                       
1 Petroleum subsidies can broadly be differentiated into consumer and producer subsidies. This paper focuses mainly on 
consumer subsidies, which often come in the form of price controls (IEA 2007). 
2 In this paper we focus on economic and social impacts of subsidy reform. Environmental impacts, especially through GHG 
emission reductions, are expected to be positive (Ellis 2010). 
3 Clements et al. (2003), Jensen and Tarr (2002), Burniaux (2009), and von Moltke, McKee, and Morgan (2004) are based 
on economic modeling. Hope and Singh (1995) base their results on simple correlation analysis, which makes isolating growth 
effects from reform and other factors challenging.  
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Past experience with subsidy reform suggests that protecting the poor from the negative impact of 
reform is most important for success. The immediate negative effect on real household incomes, 
especially those of the poor, may explain why petroleum subsidy reform is often accompanied by social 
tensions or even riots. However, reform experience from other countries shows that social unrest can be 
mitigated, if targeted compensation is provided, accompanied by effective publicity campaigns that raise 
awareness of the social inequality created by subsidies (Bacon and Kojima 2010) and the removal of 
obstacles to sustainable growth created by subsidies. Several countries have successfully applied direct 
cash transfers to protect the most vulnerable household groups from the negative consequences of 
reforms. For example, Chile used several rounds of cash transfers to the poorest 1.4 million households, 
China compensated the poor with monthly payments to offset rising fuel costs, and Indonesia installed 
quarter-annual payments of US$30 during one year for 15.5 million poor households, or 28 percent of the 
population. Ghana used a more indirect approach and abolished fees for all public primary and secondary 
schools and a program to improve public transportation (Bacon and Kojima 2010). 
Yemen is among the countries that most recently reduced its petroleum subsidies. A combination 
of declining oil revenues and the high fiscal costs to sustain the subsidy in combination with a resulting 
large budget deficit in 2009, estimated at about 10 percent of GDP (IMF, 2010), which led policy makers 
in Yemen to reconsider the future of the petroleum subsidy.  Yemen is the country with the lowest per 
capita income in the group of high subsidizers; there are only a few other countries in the world with 
lower fuel prices than Yemen, among them Libya, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and Kuwait, which all 
have a significantly higher per capita income (Figure A.1 in the Appendix) and higher oil or gas reserves 
per capita. 
Reforming the petroleum subsidy may provide a new impetus for Yemen’s ailing economy and 
may become an important part of a broader effort to tackle Yemen’s economic and social development 
problems. Yemen faces a number of challenges: slow non-hydrocarbon growth, little economic 
diversification, high population growth, decreasing oil production, unsustainable use of water resources, 
and high levels of poverty and food insecurity. The economy is dominated by the hydrocarbon sector (oil) 
and non-tradable services, while manufacturing and export-oriented services make up a relatively small 
share of the economy. Agriculture contributes about 10 percent to GDP, and about 30 percent of the 
Yemeni population earn their livelihood from farming. However, about 70 percent of the population lives 
in rural areas, and 34.8 percent of Yemenis live below the poverty line in 2005/2006 (World Bank 2007). 
Estimates suggest that poverty and food insecurity (as a measure of extreme poverty) has increased 
substantially due to the food crisis impact of 2008. Breisinger et al. (2011) estimate that poverty increased 
to 42.8 percent in 2009. Ecker et al. (2010) and WFP (2010) show consistently that 32 percent of the 
Yemenis suffer from food insecurity in 2009, with negative implications on current and future 
generations’ health and productivity. 
The Government of Yemen has taken some first steps to initiating comprehensive petroleum 
subsidy reform by increasing the price of fuel by about 25 percent so far in 2010. In order to contribute to 
the ongoing debate of whether and how to design continued reform, this paper assesses the economic and 
social impacts of further reform and alternative options for the allocation of resources saved. More 
specifically, this paper discusses two major scenarios: one accelerated reform path (Reform Option 1) 
where all subsidies are cut within one year, and one more gradual reform alternative (Reform Option 2) 
that phases out subsidies over a period of three years. It also considers the impacts of using the savings 
from reform for budget deficit reduction, direct transfers to households, and investments. The rest of the 
paper is organized as follows: Section 2 analyzes the role of petroleum subsidies and petroleum products 
for the government budget, producers, and consumers. Section 3 describes the computable general 
equilibrium (CGE) model, which serves as analytical tool for assessing the impact and reform options. 




2.  THE ROLE OF SUBSIDIES IN THE ECONOMY AND OPTIONS FOR REFORM 
The Role of Subsidies 
To understand and assess the potential impacts and options for reform, it is important to analyze the 
linkages between subsidies, the government budget, production, consumption and households. 
Petroleum subsidies in Yemen make up more than 20 percent of the government budget, more 
than total spending on education, health and social transfers in 2007 combined (Table 2.1).
4 The share of 
the subsidy within the category of “economic affairs” has increased dramatically over the past years, up 
from about 45 percent of total economic affairs expenditures in 1999 to 85 percent in 2007. This 
expansion of cost for the petroleum subsidy comes at the expense of other sectors. For example, fiscal 
resources for social protection remained fairly low, only 0.2 percent of total government spending was 
used for social protection and programs. 
Table 2.1—Role of petroleum subsidy in the government budget 
   2007  2008     2009 
Sector  In bill. YR 
in % of total 
expenditures     in bill. YR 
in % of total 
expenditures     in bill. YR 
in % of total 
expenditures 
Economic Affairs  473.5  27.3     827.2  37.1     483.0  27.5 
of which:                         
Industry/Trade  2.4  0.1     2.7  0.1     3.0  0.2 
Trans./Comm.  3.2  0.2     2.6  0.1     4.4  0.2 
Agriculture/Fishing  17.6  1.0     19.9  0.9     14.2  0.8 
Petroleum Subsidy  401.7  23.2     759.3  34.1     391.0  22.2 
Other Econ. Affairs  48.6  2.8     42.7  1.9     70.5  4.0 
Health  59.3  3.4     70.2  3.2     61.5  3.5 
Education  251.1  14.5     291.7  13.1     286.2  16.3 
Social  Protection  4.2  0.2     5.1  0.2     47.8  2.7 
General Public Services  416.5  24.0     452.9  20.3     320.5  18.2 
Defence  272.8  15.7     297.1  13.3     288.2  16.4 
Other  256.3  14.8     283.2  12.7     270.3  15.4 
Total  1,733.8  100.0     2,227.5  100.0     1,757.6  100.0 
Source: Yemen, Ministry of Finance (2010). 
The rising cost of the fuel subsidy has an adverse impact on the public investment program in 
infrastructure, including for transportation and telecommunication. Between 2007 and 2009, less than 1 
percent of the economic affairs budget was allocated for infrastructure construction. Investment for 
development, was largely externally financed (about 2 to 4 percent of GDP). However, there is broad 
consensus that building and investing in economic infrastructure is a key ingredient for achieving long-
term growth, economic diversification and sustainable poverty reduction. In Yemen, for example, road 
density, especially of asphalted roads, is generally low, and the average travel time by district to the 
nearest urban center can exceed three hours. Investments into the road network system, especially in rural 
areas, will therefore have large poverty-reducing effects (Breisinger et al. 2010). Improvements of road 
infrastructure are also expected to facilitate people’s access to public service facilities such as hospitals, 
schools, and administration offices and have positive spillover effects on development and 
commercialization in rural areas. Lowering of transaction costs will directly lead to new economic 
opportunities and diversification. 
The largest share of fuel subsidies goes to diesel, which made up more than two-thirds of all 
subsidized fuels in 2009 (Table 2.2): 69 percent of fuel subsidies goes to diesel; 14 percent goes to 
                                                       
4 It is important to note that the overall annual fiscal costs for the energy subsidy depends on international prices for 
petroleum products, as the domestic price is fixed. In general, the higher the international price for petroleum products, the higher 
the costs for the subsidy.  
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gasoline; and the remainder is split between LPG, kerosene, and jet fuel. In terms of total domestic fuel 
consumption, diesel accounted for the largest part, with 3.96 billion liters in 2009, followed by gasoline 
(2.04 billion), jet fuel (1.34 billion), and kerosene (0.12 billion). 
Table 2.2—Subsidy by type of fuel 
  2009  2010 Q1  2010 Q2 
Diesel       
Share in total subsidy (percent)  69  63  65 
Domestic price (PEC & large users)  17  32  74 
Domestic subsidized price (small users)  35  38  41 
Price at the Yemen border (incl. tax, freight, and so on)  158  123  134 
Total annual diesel subsidy (in billion YER)   264  90  95 
Gasoline       
Share in total subsidy  14  22  23 
Domestic price  60  63  68 
Price at the Yemen border (incl. tax, freight, and so on)  87  121  130 
Total annual gasoline subsidy (in billion YER)   55  31  33 
Total subsidy reduction (savings) YER/liter  0  3  5 
LPG       
Share in total subsidy  11  12  8 
Domestic price in YER/liter  23  30  42 
Price at the Yemen border (incl. tax, freight, and so on)  52  70  64 
Total annual LPG subsidy (in billion YER)  41  17  11 
Total subsidy reduction (savings) YER/liter  0  7  11 
Kerosene       
Share in total subsidy  4  1  2 
Domestic price  36  38  41 
Price at the Yemen border (incl. tax, freight, and so on)  112  121  134 
Total annual kerosene subsidy (in billion YER)   15  1  3 
Total subsidy reduction (savings) YER/liter  0  2  3 
Jet Fuel       
Share in total subsidy  2  2  2 
Domestic price  36  39  43 
Price at the Yemen border (incl. tax, freight, and so on)  97  123  136 
Subsidy (in billion YER)  9  3  4 
Subsidy as a percentage of import prices  63  69  68 
Total fuel subsidy (in billion YER)  385  142  146 
Sources: Yemen, Ministry of Finance (2010), IMF (2010), and World Bank (2010). 
Subsidies impact economic sectors and households differently, depending on the respective share 
of fuel in production and in consumption. Households consume about 10 percent of all fuel products 
(Table 2.3); most of the fuel is consumed as intermediate inputs in agriculture, industry, and services. 
About 40 percent of all fuel is used for transportation, followed by the mining sector (mainly oil 
production) and industries. Agriculture consumes about 12 percent of all fuel, mostly for irrigation. 
Interestingly, fuel is the single largest expenditure item for agricultural production despite the petroleum 
subsidy.
5  The transport sector as the biggest consumer of fuel constitutes also an important input for the 
production of other sectors; industry and services are the most transportation-intensive sectors, with 
transportation making up 14 and 8 percent of their output, respectively. 
   
                                                       
5 This is largely due to the pumped ground water needed to irrigate farms.  
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Table 2.3—Role of fuel products in the economy 
  
Share in total fuel 
consumption 
Fuel intensity in 
production/ consumption 
Fuel import 
intensity by sector 
Agriculture  12.4  19.6  49.8 
Fuel products  0.5  7.0  184.6 
Industry  29.9  11.6  34.7 
Transport  40.0  30.8  — 
Other services  7.1  2.3  — 
Households  10.1  1.2  — 
   Urban  37.1  1.1  — 
   Rural  62.9  1.2  — 
Source: Based on HBS (2005/2006) and the Social Accounting Matrix of 2009. 
In general, direct effects on households from subsidy reform relate to their consumption of fuel 
products, whereas indirect effects relate to the change in real household incomes because of higher 
production costs of goods and services. Consistent with evidence from other countries, the direct 
expenditure for fuel is modest at 1,805 Yemeni Rials (YER) per capita per year, or about 1.2 percent of 
household expenditure, on average (Table 2.4). The per capita amount is higher for urban households 
(2,659 YER) than for rural households (1,363 YER) in absolute terms.  However, rural households spend 
a higher share of their income on fuel: 1.2 percent compared with 1.1 percent for their rural counterparts. 
Indirect consumption of fuel matters more.
6 To illustrate this point, consider the case of transportation: 
Household expenditure on transportation (which is fuel intensive, see Table 2.3) is about eight times 
higher than expenditure on fuel and accounts for 8.7 percent of household expenditure nationwide, while 
urban households spend a much higher share on transportation than rural households. In summary, 
petroleum subsidies make up a significant share of government expenditures and play an important direct 
and indirect role for real household incomes. Subsidy reform is expected to reduce household welfare and 
alter the production costs of economic activities in the short run, while freeing up substantial resources 
that can be used for alternative spending. Therefore, capturing the direct and indirect effects of subsidy 
reform will be the key for meaningful analysis. The next sections will lay out the analytical strategy to 
capture these effects and assess alternative options for reform. 
Table 2.4—The share of fuel products in household consumption 
   Total  Urban  Rural 
Fuel products       
Per capita expenditure (YER/year)  1,805  2,659  1,363 
Share in total expenditure  1.2  1.1  1.2 
Transport       
Per capita expenditure (YER/year)  13,281  46,130  6,677 
Share in total expenditure  8.5  12.9  5.8 
Fuel plus transport       
Per capita expenditure (YER/year)  15,086  48,790  8,040 
Share in total expenditure  9.7  14.0  7.0 
Source: Based on HBS (2005/2006) and SAM (2009). 
Options for Petroleum Subsidy Reform 
This paper analyzes two major scenarios: an accelerated reform path (Reform Option 1) where all 
subsidies are cut within one year, and a more gradual reform option (Reform Option 2) that phases out 
subsidies over a period of three years (Table 2.5). In the accelerated scenario, subsidies would be 
                                                       
6 Key household characteristics are summarized in Table A.1 in the Appendix.  
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eliminated from an estimated 391 billion YER in 2009 to zero in 2011.
7 This would, ceteris paribus, 
imply a reduction of the fiscal deficit by one-half, from 6.9 percent to 3.5 percent of GDP, with remaining 
surplus from reform of 215 billion YER. In the gradual reform scenario, subsidies are phased out by equal 
amounts (130 billion YER) from 2011 to 2013. Ceteris paribus, the total savings from reform are smaller 
due to continued fiscal costs for subsidies in 2011 and 2012, thus the fiscal deficit is reduced  more 
slowly. 
Table 2.5—Fuel subsidy reform options 
    Reform 1, accelerated  Reform 2, gradual 
   2009  2011  2012  2013  2011  2012  2013 
Fuel subsidy (change)                 
Subsidy (percent)     –100  0  0  –33  –50  –100 
Subsidy (billion YER)      –391  0  0  –130  –130  –130 
Subsidy (million $US)      –1,777  0  0  –593  –592  –593 
Remaining subsidy (billion YER)   391  0  0  0  261  130  0 
Remaining subsidy (in million US$)  1,777  0  0  0  1,185  593  0 
Fiscal deficit (change)                  
Fiscal deficit (percent of GDP)  6.9  3.5  3.5  3.5  5.8  4.6  3.5 
Fiscal deficit (in billion YER)  352  176  0  0  293  235  176 
Fiscal deficit (in million US$)  1,600  800  0  0  1,333  1,067  800 
Surplus from reform/ spending      215  0  0  72  72  72 
Sources: IFPRI, based on IMF (2010), MoF (2010), and World Bank (2010). 
In both the accelerated and the gradual reform scenarios, we consider three alternative uses of 
savings from the subsidy:  first, total savings are used for deficit reduction, second, we also consider the 
impact of using part of the savings from reform for direct transfers to the poorest households.  Finally, 
given Yemen’s need for infrastructure investment and the expected high returns from such investment, we 
consider the impact of scaling up infrastructure investment with productivity-spillovers in a third sub-
scenario. 
                                                       
7 It is important to note that 2009 was a year with relatively low international oil prices resulting in lower fiscal costs for the 
subsidy. Therefore, the following analysis may underestimate the effects of subsidy reduction.  
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3.  MODELING THE IMPACTS OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY REFORM 
Assessing economic and poverty impacts of petroleum subsidy reform requires an economy-wide model 
that captures the major linkages between subsidy reduction, production, consumption, and households. In 
addition, given that many of the effects arise from changes in relative prices, social accounting matrix 
(SAM)–based CGE models are more suitable than SAM-based multiplier models that have previously 
been used in comparable studies. 
The CGE model is used in this paper and is constructed consistently with the neoclassical general 
equilibrium theory. The theoretical background and the analytical framework of CGE models have been 
well documented in Dervis, de Melo, and Robinson (1982); the detailed mathematical presentation of a 
static CGE model is described in Lofgren, Harris, and Robinson (2002). The recursive dynamic version of 
the CGE model is based on this standard CGE model with the incorporation of a series of dynamic 
factors. The early version of this dynamic CGE (DCGE) model can be found in Thurlow (2004), and its 
recent applications include Diao et al. (2007) and Breisinger, Diao, and Thurlow (2009), and Breisinger et 
al. 2010. A summary of the main equations can be found in Table A.2 in the Appendix. 
To develop the DCGE model for Yemen, we first update a 2007 SAM to represent Yemen’s 
economy in 2009 as the main database for the model. For the updating process we used national accounts 
data for 2009 provided by the Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation (MOPIC). Major data 
sources for the 2007 SAM construction include the latest supply-use table from the Central Statistics 
Organization (CSO), balance of payments from the Bank of Yemen (BoY), government budget data from 
the Ministry of Finance, the 2008 Agricultural Yearbook from the Ministry of Agriculture and Irrigation, 
and the latest Household Budget Survey (HBS 2005/2006). These data sources have been complemented 
with information from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The model is very detailed 
at the production, commodity, factor, and household levels and includes 65 production activities, 65 
commodities, 15 factors of production, and 12 household types.
8 Factors of production include labor 
according to the skill level (unskilled, semiskilled, skilled) and employment by the public and private 
sectors. 
In addition to the SAM as the main data source to calibrate to a set of parameters in both 
production and demand functions, a DCGE model also requires several elasticities. The main elasticities 
include the substitution elasticity between primary inputs in the value-added production function, which 
determine the ease with which, for example, users of fuel can substitute fuel for other inputs; the elasticity 
between domestically produced and consumed goods and exported or imported goods; and the income 
elasticity in the demand functions. The income elasticity with regard to fuel, for example, decides how 
consumers react to higher prices. We estimated the income elasticity for Yemen from a semi-log inverse 
function suggested by King and Byerlee (1978) and based on the data of HBS 2005/2006 for rural and 
urban households separately. These elasticities range from, for example, 0.31 for cereals to 2.2 for 
transport and 1.95 for fuel, where most elasticities are lower for urban households than for rural.
9 For 
elasticities that could not be estimated econometrically due to lack of data, we use international standards 
numbers based on IFPRI research: For the substitution between intermediate inputs and value added in 
the production function, we use a constant elasticity of transformation (CES). For the factor substitution 
elasticity we choose 1.2, the elastic of transformation is 4.0; and the Armington elasticity is 6.0 for all 
goods and services. 
The model is recursive dynamic; that is, the dynamics occur between 2010 and 2015 in each year. 
In the baseline scenario as well as in all other scenarios, we assume that the nominal exchange rate is 
flexible. Exogenous variables in the model include the government consumption, transfers to households, 
foreign inflows, population growth and hence growth of the workforce—which all grow exogenously 
according to their trends in recent years. Investments are savings driven, which means that an increase of 
                                                       
8 For a detailed list of production activities, commodities, factors of production, household types, and other accounts of the 
2007 SAM, see Table A.3 in the Appendix. 
9 Table A.4 in the Appendix presents the complete list of imputed income elasticities.  
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either private or public savings increases the economy-wide investment rate. The government budget is 
flexible in the model, which means that the government can adjust to changes in revenues and spending 
by increasing or decreasing the budget deficit (or its savings). For example, if petroleum subsidies are 
reduced, the government savings increase. This leads to an overall increase of savings in the economy, 
and thus to higher investment. It is important to note that real sector CGE models in general cannot 
capture the long-term benefits of low public debt/GDP levels and related lower interest rates for 
borrowing capital. 
At the sector level, total factor productivity (TFP) increases exogenously to account for the 
differential growth patterns across sectors. Non-hydrocarbon capital is fully mobile across all sectors, and 
its inter-temporal allocation follows the highest profitability by sector and period. Capital employed in the 
hydrocarbon sector is sector specific and cannot move to other sectors. Population growth, land, and 
productivity growth are all exogenously determined. Baseline growth in the model is driven by population 
growth (3 percent), supply of labor (3 percent), annual TFP growth changes of 3 percent in all 
nonagricultural sectors from 2010 to 2015, and an increase in government spending consistent with 
annual growth rates (3 percent). Changes of growth rates in the different scenarios relative to the base are 
mainly due to endogenous processes, such as the change of relative prices for factors and commodities 
from subsidy removal. Changes in public spending from subsidy reform are accounted for by exogenous 
changes in government transfers to households and sector level changes in TFP. For the size of these 
changes see Table 3.1. 
Table 3.1—Scenario assumptions 
   Government transfers  Subsidy  TFP 
Reform 1 (accelerated)       
1A: Use all savings for budget 
consolidation  
as base  100% decrease of 
subsidy in 2011 
as base 
1B: Reduce fiscal deficit by 50% 
and use remainder for direct 
transfers to households 
increase transfers in 2011 
between 40% and 380% 
depending on initial size of 
transfers and population 
shares 
100% decrease of 
subsidy in 2011 
as base 
1C: Reduce fiscal deficit by 50%, 
compensate only the poorest of 
the poor, and use remainder for 
productivity-enhancing 
investments 
increase transfers in 2011 
between 22% and 155% 
depending on initial size of 
transfers and population 
shares 
100% decrease of 
subsidy in 2011 
22% in construction, 
electricity, water, trade 
transport in 2011; from 
2013, 1 percent TFP 
growth in all sectors 
Reform 2 (gradual)          
2A: Use all savings for budget 
consolidation  
as base  33%, 50%, 100% 
reduction from 
2011 to 2013 
as base 
2B: Reduce fiscal deficit by 50% 
and use remainder for direct 
transfers to households 
increase transfers from 
30%–100% in 2011 to 
15%–50% in 2013  
33%, 50%, 100% 
reduction from 
2011 to 2013 
as base 
2C: Reduce fiscal deficit by 50%, 
compensate only the poorest of 
the poor, and use remainder for 
productivity-enhancing 
investments 
increase transfers from 
20%–74% in 2011 to 20% 
in 2013  
33%, 50%, 100% 
reduction from 
2011 to 2013 
7% in construction, 
electricity, water, trade and 
transport 2011–2013; from 
2014, 1% TFP growth in all 
sectors 
Source: DCGE model results. 
To capture the distinct nature of the Yemeni labor market, mainly characterized by public/private 
employment and different skill levels, the model includes six types of labor. Accordingly, there are 
different wage rates for labor employed with the government and the private sector. Within each of the  
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groups, workers are fully mobile and wage rates differ among skilled, semi-skilled, and unskilled labor. 
With this set-up the model can capture some of the distributional effects of growth that has characterized 
the Yemeni economy over the past years. Growth of the past years has been oil driven and did not trickle 
down to the poor and rural areas (World Bank 2007). One of the reasons were the segmented labor 
markets, where only few highly skilled laborers in the oil sector and government employees benefited 
from oil production and related government revenues. 
Finally, the DCGE model links to a micro-simulation model, which allows for the endogenous 
estimation of growth impact on poverty reduction. All HBS sample households are included in the micro-
simulation model, and their total expenditures and expenditures on each commodity or commodity group 
are linked to each of the six representative households included in the DCGE model. The endogenous 
changes derived from the DCGE model for the six representative households are used to recalculate 
consumption expenditure of their corresponding households in the survey dataset. New levels of total 
consumption expenditures are recalculated based on individual household budgets; and the new poverty 
rates for each region, rural and urban, and the national total are obtained by comparing expenditure levels 
(in real terms) with the official poverty line defined for HBS. 
With the CGE and micro-simulation models, we quantify the impact of the accelerated (Reform 
Option 1) and the gradual (Reform Option 2) reform scenarios; within each of these scenarios, we analyze 
the potential effects assuming that subsidy savings are used (a) only for budget consolidation, (b) for 
budget consolidation and direct transfers to households, and (c) for budget consolidation and direct 
transfers plus productivity-enhancing investments. Results of these six scenarios are reported as relative 
changes to the baseline scenario. In scenarios 1C and 2C, we assume investment-growth elasticity of 0.5; 
that is, a 1 percent increase in investment leads to 0.5 percent growth in these sectors. Table 3.1 




4.  IMPACT OF PETROLEUM SUBSIDY REFORM OPTIONS 
Accelerated versus Gradual Reform 
The first set of simulations (1A and 2A) look at a situation where the government reduces petroleum 
subsidies without taking further action. Lower petroleum subsidies have essentially two effects. At the 
sector level, higher prices for petrol and diesel increase intermediate input cost and reduce sectoral 
profitability and production, particularly in energy-intensive sectors. At the macro level, they lead to a 
redistribution of income from the private sector to the government, thereby reducing the government’s 
deficit, crowding-in public investment, and increasing the economy’s overall capital stock. Thus, this 
scenario can also be broadly interpreted as a budget-consolidation scenario.
10 While the cost-push effects 
are felt immediately, the capacity effect sets in with a one period time lag. In a first-round effect, energy 
price increases lead to rising domestic prices, lowering real household incomes and appreciating the real 
exchange rate (assuming constant world market prices). Results from the DCGE model show that overall 
growth drops in the initial year of reform under scenario 1A and is close to zero under 1B but recovers 
quickly in subsequent years (Figure 4.1). 
Figure 4.1—Growth and poverty reduction effects of accelerated versus gradual reform 
   
Source: DCGE model results. Note: GDP is at market prices, including indirect taxes 
Timing and Design of the Reform Matter 
Rapid phasing out leads to an initial drop in growth and a sharper spike in poverty, while gradual 
reductions smoothen the growth and poverty effects. Slow phasing out is therefore preferable from a 
growth and poverty-reduction perspective; growth shocks, especially in the agricultural sector, are less 
pronounced, and total household income losses are about 20 percent lower. However, slow reform comes 
at a higher fiscal cost because subsidies effectively need to be financed for two more years compared with 
the accelerated one-year phase-out, amounting to additional costs of 391 billion YER (Table 2.5). Thus, 
the faster the phasing out of subsidies, the more fiscal space exists for the government to compensate 
households and to invest. 
                                                       
10 It is important to note that if the savings would be used for deficit reduction and budget consolidation, positive medium- 
to long-term effects can be expected, such as higher credit ratings and lower interest rates (see also section with model 































































































Reform 2 (gradual) 
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While the direction of growth and poverty impact is the same, the size of the impact by sector 
differs depending on their production structure. The agricultural sector would be the hardest hit under 
both the accelerated and the gradual reforms, mainly due to its strong dependence on diesel for irrigation 
(Table 4.1). Even before subsidy reduction, fuel is the most expensive item in crop production, as nearly 
one-third of crop production expenditure is used for fuel purchase. The output especially of water-
intensive crops like qat, fruits, and vegetables drops and hurts household incomes from agriculture and 
agricultural exports.
11 Given its high profitability, Qat is less affected despite its intensive use of diesel 
for groundwater extraction. Compared with the baseline, agricultural growth declines by 4.1 percentage 
points in 2011 in the accelerated scenario and slows between 1.1 and 1.4 percent annually during the 
gradual reform scenario. However, in both cases, agricultural growth resumes due to substitution and 
adjustment effects. The withdrawal of petroleum subsidies also affects the industrial sector relative to the 
baseline during the early years of reform. But as in the case of agriculture, growth is estimated to quickly 
recover and accelerate, initially because of the adjustment process and subsequently because of higher 
productivity and related new investment opportunities arising after reform, which improve 
competitiveness. Mainly due to the low substitutability and the domestic orientation of most services, the 
service sector is the least affected sector and continues to grow modestly during reform.
12 
Table 4.1—Economic growth and poverty impact of the subsidy reform 
   2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
Baseline    Annual change          
   GDP (billion YER)  5.090  4.52  4.30  4.27  4.24  4.20  4.18 
   Poverty  42.8  3.07  3.26  3.22  3.39  3.31  3.22 
Reform 1 (accelerated)     Annual change from base          
   1A               
   GDP (share)  100  0.00  –0.13  0.13  0.27  0.23  0.22 
      Agriculture  8.3  0.00  –4.05  0.21  0.19  0.14  0.09 
      Industry  38.3  0.00  –1.15  –0.22  0.21  0.17  0.17 
      Services  53.4  0.00  0.79  0.29  0.40  0.35  0.33 
   Poverty  42.8  0.00  3.00  2.91  2.71  2.70  2.21 
      Rural  47.6  0.00  2.91  2.75  2.53  2.61  1.99 
         Nonfarm  50.4  0.00  2.08  2.32  2.06  2.28  1.41 
         Farm  42.0  0.00  4.58  3.62  3.48  3.29  3.18 
      Urban  29.9  0.00  3.23  3.34  3.19  2.94  2.79 
Compensation required for poorest one-third of population under 1A         
      Per household (YER)  0  0  18,997  20,405  20,200  19,764  18,886 
      Total (billion YER)  0  1  17  18  18  18  17 
   1B     Annual change from base          
   GDP (share)  100.0  0.00  –0.12  0.11  0.24  0.21  0.20 
      Agriculture  8.3  0.00  –3.56  0.18  0.17  0.11  0.07 
      Industry  38.3  0.00  –1.20  –0.26  0.17  0.15  0.14 
      Services  53.4  0.00  0.75  0.26  0.37  0.32  0.31 
   Poverty  42.8  0.00  1.82  1.66  1.72  1.25  1.15 
      Rural  47.6  0.00  1.29  0.98  1.17  0.60  0.54 
         Nonfarm  50.4  0.00  0.34  0.43  0.68  0.15  0.01 
         Farm  42.0  0.00  3.23  2.10  2.15  1.51  1.62 
               
                                                       
11 More than 75 percent of irrigated land uses groundwater for irrigation, contributing to rapidly falling water tables. Most of 
the land under irrigation is planted with qat, followed by cereals and vegetables. The subsidization of irrigation pumps and the 
subsidies of diesel have led to a serious overuse of groundwater, resulting in rapidly falling water tables. In addition, cheap fuel 
has also encouraged traders to extract water and transport it to distant regions, often to irrigate qat plantations. Water transported 
by truck is used on 2.3 percent of the total irrigated land, and this share has most likely increased since the time of the census 
from which these data stem. 
12 Table A.5 in the Appendix gives an overview of the effects of both reform options on the main macroeconomic accounts 




   2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
   1C     Annual change from base          
   GDP (share)  100.0  0.00  –0.04  1.15  0.89  0.91  0.88 
      Agriculture  8.3  0.00  0.26  0.15  –0.16  –0.17  –0.19 
      Industry  38.3  0.00  2.18  1.88  1.44  1.46  1.39 
      Services  53.4  0.00  –0.78  1.46  1.11  1.09  1.01 
   Poverty  42.8  0.00  –0.03  –1.34  –3.10  –4.72  –6.03 
      Rural  47.6  0.00  –0.02  –1.65  –3.53  –5.27  –6.76 
         Nonfarm  50.4  0.00  –0.06  –0.53  –1.98  –3.26  –4.10 
         Farm  42.0  0.00  –0.24  –2.07  –3.94  –5.60  –7.47 
      Urban  29.9  0.00  0.44  –0.79  –2.68  –4.58  –5.30 
Reform 2 (gradual)     Annual change from base          
   2A  2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  2014  2015 
   GDP (share)  100.0  0.00  0.01  0.21  0.21  0.18  0.15 
      Agriculture  8.3  0.00  –1.07  –1.18  –1.35  0.16  0.12 
      Industry  38.3  0.00  –0.28  –0.37  –0.46  0.02  0.18 
      Services  53.4  0.00  0.23  0.31  0.42  0.31  0.35 
   Poverty  42.8  0.00  0.49  1.35  2.44  2.57  2.10 
      Rural  47.6  0.00  0.40  1.26  2.24  2.49  1.88 
         Nonfarm  50.4  0.00  0.73  1.60  2.98  2.78  2.68 
         Farm  42.0  0.00  0.28  0.94  1.84  2.18  1.39 
      Urban  29.9  0.00  0.63  1.91  3.05  3.13  2.89 
Compensation required for poorest one-third of population under2A         
      Per household (YER)  0.0  0.00  3,083  8,687  19,142  19,249  18,601 
      Total (billion YER)  0.0  0.00  3  8  17  17  17 
   2B    Annual change from base       
   GDP (share)  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.2  0.2 
      Agriculture  8.3  0.0  –0.9  –1.0  –1.1  0.1  0.1 
      Industry  38.3  0.0  –0.3  –0.4  –0.5  0.0  0.1 
      Services  53.4  0.0  0.2  0.3  0.4  0.3  0.3 
   Poverty  42.8  0.00  0.22  0.26  0.98  0.76  0.74 
      Rural  47.6  0.00  0.09  –0.18  0.29  0.00  0.06 
         Nonfarm  50.4  0.00  0.58  1.42  2.79  2.74  2.55 
         Farm  42.0  0.00  0.00  –0.54  0.27  –0.08  –0.16 
      Urban  29.9  0.00  0.27  0.53  0.34  0.18  0.50 
   2C    Annual change from base       
   GDP (share)  100.0  0.0  0.0  0.3  0.4  0.7  0.7 
      Agriculture  8.3  0.0  0.1  0.0  –0.2  –0.2  –0.2 
      Industry  38.3  0.0  0.6  0.9  0.9  1.1  1.2 
      Services  53.4  0.0  –0.2  0.2  0.5  0.9  0.9 
   Poverty  42.8  0.00  –0.33  –0.96  –1.49  –2.82  –4.28 
      Rural  47.6  0.00  –0.36  –1.24  –2.00  –3.36  –5.00 
         Nonfarm  50.4  0.00  –0.26  –0.22  –0.14  –1.40  –2.40 
         Farm  42.0  0.00  –0.35  –1.58  –2.42  –3.79  –5.64 
      Urban  29.9  0.00  –0.37  –0.55  –1.15  –2.49  –3.70 
Source: DCGE model results. 
Both reform scenarios raise poverty levels up to 3.0 (accelerated) and 2.6 (gradual) percentage 
points above baseline values during the reform process. Under both scenarios, poverty starts declining 
after reform, but it is important to note that it may take some years after reform for households to recover,  
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if no additional measures are taken. As an aggregate group, urban households are more affected than rural 
households, with poverty increases of between 3.3 and 3.1 percentage points, compared with 2.9 and 2.6 
percentage points for rural households. However, as a subgroup of rural households, farm households are 
the most affected, especially those that rely on irrigation-intensive agriculture for their incomes. However, 
it is important to keep in mind that rural nonfarm households, which are less affected, are higher in 
number and have higher initial poverty levels (Appendix, Table A.1). 
Given this increase in poverty across all population groups and considering the experience from 
other countries, the question arises as to how much compensation would be needed for the poorest of the 
poor. Model results show that this compensation in Reform 1 and Reform 2 will require direct transfer 
payments of about 19,700 YER and 13,800 YER, respectively, per household and per year for the poorest 
30 percent on average (Figure 4.2 and Table 4.1). The total annual cost of compensating this group during 
the period of 2010 to 2015 is estimated at about 17.6 billion YER under the accelerated reform and 12.3 
billion YER with under the gradual reform (Table 4.1). In the accelerated reform, losses in real incomes 
peak in the second year and steadily decline over time; while in the gradual scenario, real incomes decline 
in the fourth year before picking up from the fifth year on. However, even several years after reform, real 
incomes are likely to remain below their baseline levels, indicating that direct transfers are not generating 
sufficient growth for sustainable fiscal and economic development. 
Figure 4.2—Compensation required under accelerated and gradual scenario 
 
Source: DCGE model results. 
Using the Savings for Budget Consolidation, Direct Transfers, and Investment 
Fuel subsidy reform provides the Yemeni government with the financial resources to reduce the budget 
deficit; to provide transfers; and to invest in generating new growth, employment, and income 
opportunities. To illustrate this point and to assess the impacts of such measures, the reform scenarios 
1B–2B and 1C–2C investigate the trade-offs and synergies between “transfers” and “investments”. Given 
the urgent need for fiscal deficit reduction, we consider parts of the savings from reform to be used for 
deficit reduction consistent with Table 2.5 in both sets of simulations. 
Results from 1B and 2B show that using all savings for direct transfers strongly smoothens the 
negative impacts on households, yet growth impulses for sustainable development are likely to be limited. 
In addition, the impact of transfers obviously strongly depends on the targeting and the efficiency of 
service delivery. In our example of this paper we assume a distribution of transfers according to initial 
poverty status and population size, ergo the biggest beneficiaries will be the rural households. While 


































Compensation needed for the poorest one-third of households
Reform 1 (accelerated)
Reform 2 (gradual) 
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prices, growth acceleration remains limited. Income multiplier effects are low, import intensity of major 
consumer goods including food is high, and the positive effect on private consumption cannot compensate 
for the loss in other GDP components, namely exports. 
Direct transfers will not be sufficient to alleviate the negative effects of reform in fuel subsidies. 
While they can mitigate the short-term negative effect on the poorest of the poor, they may not be fiscally 
sustainable, and their impact on growth is limited. Therefore, additional measures are needed. 
Productivity-enhancing investments make an important contribution to development and provide the 
foundation for poverty reduction and growth. Scenarios 1C and 2C reflect the case in which the remaining 
savings of the fuel subsidy are used to improve infrastructure such as transport and communication. The 
remainder of the savings, 127 billion YER in scenario 1C and 153 billion YER in 2C, is invested in the 
electricity, water, transport, trade, and construction sectors. Improved infrastructure lowers transaction 
costs; offers the opportunity to integrate economic spaces in Yemen; and creates the platform for a 
restructuring of productive, industrial, and service value chains, which could be exploited by enabling 
domestic and foreign private investment. Based on the experience of many other countries, it is assumed 
that after an initial time lag of two to three years this public investment triggers additional growth in all 
sectors by creating higher economy-wide efficiencies. 
Results show that this type of growth has strong poverty-reducing effects and, in addition to its 
long-term development effect, can more than mitigate the negative short-term effects of subsidy reform. 
Growth acceleration and the related increase in returns to factors, especially labor, are the main drivers of 
poverty reduction. During the initial years, investment-related income, for example, from construction 
jobs, creates additional income for the poor. Then, when investment-induced direct effects phase out and 
other sectors start benefiting from new infrastructures, growth accelerates economy-wide and boosts the 
incomes of all households, including the poorest. Overall poverty reduction is higher under the 
accelerated reform scenario and poverty declines sharply by the end of the six-year period considered 
here, by 6 (accelerated) and 4 (gradual) percentage points. This can be explained by the fact that under 
accelerated reform, more resources become earlier available for investment, which then translates earlier 
into economy-wide growth effects. However, in both cases, investment-induced growth benefits rural and 
urban households if investments are also spread to rural areas. 
The combination of direct transfers and investment is therefore a promising strategy for 
combining subsidy reform with the promotion of sustainable development. Transfers, investments, and 





5.  CONCLUSION 
There is an urgent need for reforming petroleum subsidies in Yemen. However, lessons from other 
countries suggest that while efficiency gains are likely to lead to growth acceleration in the medium-term, 
poverty often increases under reform. To help guiding the reform process in Yemen, this paper has 
provided an analysis of economic linkages between the existing subsidy and the government budget 
balance, production, and consumers. It has also assessed the impact of alternative reform scenarios on 
economic sectors and poverty. 
Yemen is among the countries with the lowest fuel-pump prices in the world. The petroleum 
subsidy makes up 85 percent of all public spending related to economic affairs and is more than the total 
spending on health, education, and social protection combined. Especially social transfers and 
investments in infrastructure, key ingredients for growth and poverty-reduction strategies, remain at 
extremely low levels. Consistent with results found in other countries, we find that the direct impact of 
petroleum subsidy reform on households’ real income is likely to be modest given the low share of fuel in 
private expenditure. We therefore use an economy-wide DCGE model to also capture the indirect effects 
of reform. 
Results of the model show that poverty will increase for both, rural and urban households, if no 
additional measures are taken. Considering an accelerated scenario (reform during one year, Reform 1) 
versus a gradual scenario (reform during three years, Reform 2) shows that the timing and design of the 
reform do matter: Rapid phasing out leads to an initial drop in growth and a sharper spike in poverty, 
while gradual reductions smoothen the growth and poverty effects. Slow phasing out is therefore 
preferable from a growth and poverty-reduction perspective. However, slow reform comes at a higher 
fiscal expense; thus, the faster the phasing out of subsidies, the more fiscal space exists for the 
government to compensate households and to invest. 
Compensating the poorest of the poor for their losses during reform will be important for success, 
yet it may not be sufficient. Model results show that this compensation under Reform 1 and Reform 2 will 
require direct transfer payments of between 19,700 YER and 13,800 YER, respectively, per year and 
household for the poorest 30 percent of the households on average. In general, using all savings for direct 
transfers strongly smoothens the negative impacts on households, yet growth impulses for sustainable 
development are limited. In addition, the impact of transfers strongly depends on the targeting and the 
efficiency of service delivery. 
Therefore, a combination of fiscal deficit reduction, social transfers and investments is the most 
promising reform strategy. For the short term, social transfers will compensate the poorest from a 
negative income effect stemming from the reform as well as enhanced income opportunities in 
construction related to the public investment derived from the subsidy savings. Investments in utilities, 
transport, trade and construction sectors will lower transaction costs, offer the opportunity to integrate 
economic spaces in Yemen. Thus, for the medium term, fuel subsidy reform offers to create the platform 
for a restructuring of productive, industrial and service value chains, which could be exploited by 
enabling domestic and foreign private investment. The combined short and medium term effects do not 
only avoid an increase in poverty but also lead to broadened options for pro-poor growth in Yemen. 
The Government of Yemen has made a first step to reform the fuel subsidy by increasing fuel 
prices in 2010. This paper has shown that continuing this reform process offers a great opportunity for 
development if the transition to higher fuel prices is designed properly and the overall petroleum subsidy 
reform is integrated in Yemen’s overall development strategy. 
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APPENDIX: SUPPLEMENTARY TABLES AND FIGURE 
Figure A.1—Fuel prices in the Middle East and North Africa region 
 
Source: Based on GTZ (2010). 





















Total  23,307  7.8  145,593  4.0  42.8  32.1 
      Rural  17,086  8.0  122,201  3.3  47.6  37.3 
         Farm  5,481  8.3  125,791  4.2  50.4  33.4 
         Nonfarm  11,605  7.9  114,600  2.9  42.0  39.2 
      Urban  6,221  7.2  209,839  5.0  29.9  17.8 
   Extreme poor  7,480  8.1  63,979  4.4     
Source: Based on HBS (2005/2006); poverty and food security estimates are taken from Breisinger et al. (2010) and Ecker et al. 
(2010), respectively. 
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fct f ct ct F Q
δ α ∏ ⋅ =   (1) 
Factor payments 
ct ct fc c fct c ft Q P F W ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ∑ ∑ δ   (2) 
Import supply  0 ≥ ⊥ ⋅ ≤ ct
m
c t ct M W E P   (3) 
Export demand  0 ≥ ⊥ ⋅ ≥ ct
e
c t ct X W E P   (4) 
Household income 
t h fct ft hf fc ht E r F W Y ⋅ + ⋅ ⋅ =∑ θ   (5) 
Consumption demand  ( ) ht h hc hct ct Y v D P ⋅ − ⋅ = ⋅ 1 β   (6) 
Investment demand  ( ) b E Y I P
t ht h h c ct ct v + ⋅ ⋅ = ⋅ ∑ ρ   (7) 




c + + ⋅ = ⋅ ∑   (8) 
Product market equilibrium 
ct ct hct h ct ct X I D M Q + + = + ∑   (9) 
Factor market equilibrium 
ft fct c s F = ∑   (10) 
Land and labor expansion  ( ) f t ft s s ϕ + ⋅ = − 1 1   f is land and labour  (11) 











+ − ⋅ = ∑ η   f is capital  (12) 
Technical change  ( ) c ct ct y + ⋅ = − 1 1 α α   (13) 
       
Notes:     
Subscripts  Exogenous variables   
c  Commodities or economic sectors  b  Foreign savings balance (foreign currency units) 
f  Factor groups (land, labor and capital)  r  Foreign remittances 
h  Household groups  s  Total factor supply 
t  Time periods  w  World import and export prices 
Endogenous 
variables 
  Exogenous parameters   
D  Household consumption demand quantity  α  Production shift parameter (factor productivity) 
E  Exchange (local/foreign currency units)  β  Household average budget share 
F  Factor demand quantity  γ  Hicks neutral rate of technical change 
I  Investment demand quantity  δ  Factor input share parameter 
M  Import supply quantity  η  Capital depreciation rate 
P  Commodity price  θ  Household share of factor income 
Q  Output quantity  κ  Base price per unit of capital stock 
W  Average factor return  ρ  Investment commodity expenditure share 
X  Export demand quantity  υ  Household marginal propensity to save 
Y  Total household income  φ  Land and labour supply growth rate 
       
Source: Authors’ compilation.    
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Table A.3—2009 Yemen SAM disaggregation 
Activities/Commodities    Factors of production 
Agriculture  Industry (cont.)  Labor 
Sorghum  Other processing  Private sector, unskilled 
Maize  Fish processing  Private sector, semiskilled 
Millet  Textiles and clothing  Private sector, skilled 
Wheat  Leather and shoes  Public sector, unskilled 
Barley  Wood   Public sector, semiskilled 
Other grains  Paper  Public sector, skilled 
Bananas  Printing  Capital 
Grapes  Oil refining  Capital 
Mangoes  Chemicals  Oil capital 
Citrus fruits  Fertilizer and pesticides  Gas capital 
Other fruits  Nonmetals  Land 
Potatoes  Metals  Households 
Onions  Machinery  Rural  
Tomatoes  Other manufacturing     Farm, food secure 
Other vegetables  Electricity      Farm, food insecure 
Pulses  Water     Nonfarm, food secure 
Coffee  Construction     Nonfarm, food insecure 
Sesame  Services  Urban 
Cotton  Trade     Urban, food secure 
Qat  Hotels and restaurants     Urban, food insecure 
Tobacco  Transport & communication  Other accounts 
Camel  Business services  Enterprise 
Cattle  Health  Government 
Chicken  Education  Direct taxes 
Goats & sheep  Public services  Sales taxes 
Fishery  Other services  Import tariffs 
Forestry    Savings & investment 
Industry    Rest of world 
Oil     
Gas     
Other mining     
Beverages     
Bread     
Other cereal-based food     
Dairy products     
Vegetable oil     
Sugar, processed     
Camel meat     
Beef      
Poultry     
Goat and sheep meat     
Source: Authors’ compilation. 
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Table A.4—Elasticities applied in the model 
  Rural  Urban 
Cereals  0.31  0.28 
Bananas  0.99  0.50 
Grapes  0.89  0.79 
Mangoes  0.80  0.75 
Other fruits  1.58  1.39 
Potatoes  0.40  0.40 
Vegetables  0.62  0.57 
Coffee  1.11  0.81 
Sesame  0.62  0.57 
Qat  1.25  0.93 
Tobacco  1.11  0.81 
Meat  1.02  0.49 
Wood  0.38  0.28 
Fuel  1.95  1.79 
Bread  0.19  0.12 
Dairy products  0.38  0.36 
Textiles  1.31  1.14 
Other manufacturing  2.89  1.22 
Chemicals  0.83  0.74 
Water  0.98  0.43 
Electricity  1.03  0.65 
Private services  2.18  1.55 
Public services  3.22  1.22 
Source: Authors’ estimates using HBS (2005/2006). 
Table A.5—Macro overview table 
      Reform 1 (accelerated)  Reform 2 (gradual) 
  
Initial 
(share)  Baseline   1A    1B   1C   2A   2B   2C 
Consumption  84.0  168.1  163.2  163.6  203.3  163.5  164.2  191.0 
   Private  66.4  129.7  124.7  125.2  164.9  125.1  125.7  152.6 
   Public  17.6  38.4  38.4  38.4  38.4  38.4  38.4  38.4 
Investment  28.6  141.5  186.4  184.2  284.9  182.8  180.0  247.5 
Exports  29.5  107.4  80.5  80.3  113.8  81.3  81.1  103.5 
Imports  42.1  76.2  57.5  57.4  81.4  58.0  57.9  74.0 
Real exchange rate  100  7.3  1.9  2.1  7.6  2.4  2.6  7.1 
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